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REASONABLE GROUNDWATER PUMPING LEVELS
UNDER THE APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE:
THE LAW AND UNDERLYING ECONOMIC GOALS
DOUGLAS L. GRANT*

INTRODUCTION
The extent to which well owners should be protected against decining water levels is an enduring issue of groundwater law.' The
nature and treatment of the problem have been shaped over the years
by the property right doctrine-absolute ownership, reasonable use,

correlative rights, or prior appropriation-a state has applied to
groundwater.2 In appropriation doctrine states, the initially important question was whether the principle that priority in time gives
priority in right would protect senior appropriators against interference with their historic diversion systems by later wells. In most
such states, it is now settled that seniors will be protected only in the
maintenance of reasonable groundwater pumping levels.4 The reasonable pumping level concept, however, has not been widely implemented. A National Water Commission study concluded: "No defimitive guidelines exist as to what the measure of reasonableness is or
how it will be applied." ' Commentary upon the concept has ranged
*B.A. 1962, University of Iowa; J.D. 1967, University of Colorado; Professor of Law,
University of Idaho.
This article was supported primarily with funds provided by the Office of Water Research and Technology, United States Department of the Interior, as authorized under the
Water Resources Research Act of 1964 and made available through the Idaho Water Resources Research Institute, University of Idaho. Part of the initial work was done under a research appointment in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Applied Statistics of
the College of Agriculture, University of Idaho.
1. See, e.g., Hutchins, Protection in Means of Diversion of Ground-Water Supplies, 29
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1940); Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
INST. 501 (1968); Sorensen, Groundwater- The Problem of Conservationand Interferences,
42 NEB. L. REV. 765 (1963); Widman, Groundwater-Hydrologyand the Problem of Competing Well Owners, 14 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 523 (1968); Note, Protectionof GroundWater Diversions, 5 UTAH L. REV. 181 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Protection]; Comment,
Who Pays When the Well Runs Dry?, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 402 (1965).
2. For criticism of the doctrinal approach to groundwater problems, see C. CORKER,
GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 112 (1971). This study,
written for the National Water Commission, is the most comprehensive and thorough analysis of groundwater management problems available.
3. See, e.g., Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926); Noh v. Stoner,
53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933); Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255
(1949).
4. See statutes in note 33 infra.
5. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE WATER
LAWS 56 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A SUMMARY DIGEST].
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from strong support 6 to harsh criticism.7 Thus, the currently important question is how, and even whether, the concept can be given
workable specific content.
In 1970 the ratio of groundwater use to total water use in the western states ranged from a high of 62 percent in Arizona to a low of
two percent in Montana.8 The heavier groundwater use and more
acute water level problems have tended to occur in nonappropriation
doctrine states.9 In the future, however, pressure for more intensive
groundwater management is likely to grow throughout the West. Contributing factors will include (1) rising water demands associated
with population growth, mineral development, instream flow maintenance, and water-based recreation;' 0 (2) higher energy costs for
groundwater pumping; 1' and (3) an apparent trend against federal
construction of new dams to augment surface water supplies.' 2 More
intensive management efforts are likely to use existing frameworks,
which include the reasonable pumping level concept in most appropriation states.
The primary objective of this article is to help fill the need for an6. See, e.g., W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
IN THE WEST 179 (1942) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED PROBLEMS] ; Protection,
supra note 1; Comment, South Dakota's Artesian Pressure-ShouldIt Be a ProtectedMeans
of Diversion, 16 S.D. L. REV. 481 (1971) [hereinafter cited as South Dakota's Artesian
PressureI .
7. See Crosby, A Layman's Guide to Groundwater Hydrology, in C. CORKER, supra
note 2, at 78.
8. The following percentages were reported for the eleven coterminous western-most
states in U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WESTWIDE STUDY REPORT ON CRITICAL
WATER PROBLEMS FACING THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES 50 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as WESTWIDE STUDY]:
Arizona
62
Oregon
16
New Mexico
50
Utah
16
California
38
Washington
12
Colorado
16
Wyoming
4
Idaho
16
Montana
2
Nevada
16
Montana reported one area of groundwater level decline (Great Falls). Wyoming apparently
had no areas of overdraft. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GROUND WATER: AN
OVERVIEW 14-15 (Report to Congress by the Comptroller General 1977) [hereinafter
cited as GAO].
9. See GAO, supra note 8, at 5-15; see generally 1 U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES 1975-2000, SECOND NATIONAL WATER
ASSESSMENT 18 (1978).
10. See WESTWIDE STUDY, supra note 8, at 54-62; but cf 1 U.S. WATER RESOURCES
COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 2 (predicting a decrease nationally in withdrawals for offstream
use "due to more efficient use of water as a result of conservation efforts and better technology in recycling and similar procedures").
11. See, e.g., Ellis & DuMars, The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 333, 355-56 (1978).
12. GAO, supra note 8, at 2.
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alysis of the measure of reasonableness.' 3 The introduction describes
some hydrologic aspects of the pumping level issue, related groundwater management tools, and the diverse factual situations in which
pumping level problems can arise. Key provisions of various reasonable pumping level statutes are then examined. Economic goals underlying the statutes are analyzed both in historical context and in relation to modern cost-benefit analysis. The article closes with a brief
reference to other goals that may also affect the setting of reasonable
pumping levels.
BACKGROUND

Hydrologic Aspects of the Problem' 4
An acquaintance with basic physical features of groundwater occurrence and withdrawal is needed to understand pumping level
problems. Thus, some elements of groundwater hydrology and well
hydraulics are set forth below.I s
Underground formations that will yield groundwater in significant
quantities are called aquifers.' 6 Aquifers are either confined or unconfined. In an unconfined aquifer water is held under atmospheric
pressure; in a confined (or artesian) aquifer the water is under greater
pressure because an overlying impermeable formation restrains its
movement. Water will stand in a well in an unconfined aquifer at a
level corresponding approximately with the upper surface of the part
of the ground that is saturated with water.' 7 This level is called the
13. Space limitations preclude systematic treatment of such institutional and procedural
questions as the role of the courts and administrative agencies in establishing pumping levels,
the choice of enforcement mechanism as between damages and injunctive relief, and retroactive application of pumping level statutes to water rights that predate adoption of the
appropriation doctrine.
14. The following summary, except as otherwise noted, is based upon Crosby, supra
note 7, at 38-49, 56-70; Muckel, Pumping Ground Water So As to Avoid Overdraft, in U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 1955, H.R. DOC. NO.
32, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 294-99; D. TODD, GROUND WATER HYDROLOGY 17, 26-29,
149-51 (1959).
15. For comprehensive discussions of groundwater hydrology see D. TODD, supra note
14; W. WALTON, GROUNDWATER RESOURCE EVALUATION (1970).
16. Underground streams are rather rare. Far more common is percolating groundwater,
which saturates the interstices of sand, gravel, and other permeable rock materials. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as WATER POLICIES].
Hydrologists have criticized efforts in the law to distinguish between underground
streams and percolating water. C. CORKER, supra note 2, at 147. They argue that physical
reality requires a single doctrine for all groundwater, as well as recognition of the interconnection between groundwater and surface water. See, e.g., D. TODD, supra note 14, at 300.
Modern groundwater law is moving toward this view. See pages 20 through 23 infra.
17. Due to capillary action the zone of saturation actually extends somewhat above the
water table.
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water table. Water will rise in a well in a confined aquifer to the level
of an imaginary surface called the piezometric surface. This level is a
function of the amount of artesian pressure under which the water is
confined. If the pressure is great enough, a flowing well results.
When water is withdrawn from a well the water table or pressure
surface drops. In an unconfined aquifer, the water table around the
well is drawn down in the shape of an inverted cone called a cone of
depression. If the capacity of the pump is too great for the depth of
its intake and the permeability of the surrounding rock, the tip of
the cone is pulled down so far that the well sucks air. In a confined
aquifer, the imaginary pressure surface around the well is drawn down
in the shape of an inverted cone called a cone of pressure relief. As
the pressure surface falls below the overlying impermeable formation,
a confined aquifer becomes unconfined.
Cones of depression and pressure relief are relatively localized and
perhaps temporary conditions. If a well is shut off, the water table or
the pressure surface may soon return nearly to its original level
around the well.
General water table or pressure surface decline occurs if total discharge from the basin exceeds total recharge. Total discharge includes
not only withdrawals from wells but natural discharge through
springs, flow into streams, evaporation, and transpiration. An excess
of discharge over recharge might be seasonal, with decline during the
irrigation season and recovery later, or cyclical, with decline in dry
years and recovery in wet years. Perennial withdrawals in excess of
recharge will, of course, result in permanent decline called groundwater mining.' 8
Interference with an appropriator's means of diversion because of
a decrease in water level or pressure may be a localized matter involving only a few wells with overlapping cones of depression or pressure
relief. Conversely, the interference may involve hundreds of wells and
widespread overdraft of an entire basin.' I Individual cases may, of
course, fall anywhere between these two extremes.
Related Ground Water Management Tools
Reasonable pumping level regulation is not the only mechanism
available in appropriation doctrine states to cope with declining
groundwater levels. Two related tools, well spacing and regulation of
mining, are discussed below.
18. See D. TODD, supra note 14, at 201; W. WALTON, supra note 15, at 608.
19. See W. WALTON, supra note 15, at 611; Muckel, supra note 14, at 300.
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Well Spacing
Some states have well spacing statutes which can work in conjunction with pumping level legislation.2 0 Well spacing can prevent pumping level problems caused by overlapping cones of depression or pressure relief. Even in this situation, however, a well spacing statute will
not necessarily supplant the reasonable pumping level concept. For
example, a Wyoming statute gives the state engineer power to regulate
"the spacing, distribution and location of wells in critical areas." 2 I
To develop spacing regulations, the state engineer would seem to
need the guidance of some substantive standard outside the quoted
statutory formula. Colorado requires at least 600 feet between wells
outside designated groundwater areas, unless the circumstances in a
particular instance warrant an exception. 2 2 Again, the state engineer
needs some substantive standard to pass on requests for exceptions.
South Dakota requires artesian and shallow wells to be located "in
order that the flow of the wells may be properly equalized and least
likely to interfere with each other. ' 2 3 This statute, too, requires
that a judgment be made by the state engineer. The underlying substantive standard in all these situations might appropriately be keyed
to the state's concept of a reasonable pumping level.
Regulation of Mining
While reasonable pumping level statutes could apply to water level
decline associated with long term overdraft, a number of appropriation doctrine states with such statutes also have legislation or case
law aimed specifically at such overdraft. 2 4 The two basic approaches
are to allow controlled mining or to prohibit mining. Either way, the
question arises of whether any role is left for the reasonable pumping
level statutes.
The New Mexico case of Mathers v. Texaco, Inc. 2 1 illustrates con20. See, e.g., notes 21-23 infra. Kansas has no well spacing statute as such, but several
local groundwater management districts have developed well spacing regulations. See e.g.,
Western Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 1, Rule 5-21-3 and Equus Beds
Groundwater Management District No. 2, Rule 5-22-2, promulgated pursuant to the Kansas
Water Appropriation Act, KAN. STAT. § 82a-1028(o) (Supp. 1979).
21. WYO. STAT. § 41-3-909(a)(v) (1977).
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(2) (1973). For the definition of designated
groundwater, see note 68 infra.
23. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-5 (1967). See also S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 46-6-7 (1967).
24. See notes 27-29 infra.
25. 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966). See also S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-66.1(5) (Supp. 1980). See also pages 33 through 34 infra (discussing controlled mining in
Colorado).
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trolled mining. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that a state statute protecting existing water rights against impairment from new
wells did not prevent the state engineer from granting additional permits which would, because the basin is nonrechargeable, necessarily
lower the water table and increase pumping costs. The court upheld
the state engineer's plan to allow mining of two-thirds of the water in
the basin over a 40 year period. It was projected that by then some
of the remaining water could still be economically withdrawn for
domestic use and perhaps a few other uses, but not for agriculture or
most other uses. 2 6 The mining schedule in Mathers appears premised
upon a notion of pumping lift protection for existing wells that was
considered reasonable in view of the nonrechargeable character of the
basin. The lack of recharge guaranteed continuing water level decline
and a fixed life for most wells if the resource was to be put to maximum beneficial use. The court's notion of reasonable protection was
not fundamentally different from what is embodied in explicit reasonable pumping level statutes found in other states. Thus, much of
the following discussion of factors bearing on the measure of reasonableness under pumping level statutes should also apply to controlled
mining in situations like that in Mathers.
Where statutes prohibit mining, the standards used limit groundwater withdrawals to safe sustaining yield,2 T the anticipated average
rate of future recharge, 2 8 or average annual replenishment of supply. 2 9 Most if not all of these statutes could be construed either to
prohibit mining absolutely or to impose a flexible prohibition. Under
the flexible approach mining would be allowed for a time, after
which annual withdrawals would then be curtailed to bring total discharge into equilibrium with recharge. This would make sense where
the best use of some of the water stored in the aquifer is for withdrawal and consumption on the surface but further depletion of the
water would increase pumping and other costs beyond expected benefits. Another possible justification would be that mining the top
part of storage may thereafter increase the sustained annual yield of
a basin by increasing recharge or decreasing natural discharge. 3 0
26. 77 N.M. at 243, 421 P.2d at 774.
27. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.130, .230 (1962). See also KAN. STAT. § 82a711 (1977).
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111(1)(b) (1973) (for designated groundwater);
IDAHO CODE § 42-237a(g) (Supp. 1980); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-3.1
(Supp. 1980) (state water rights commission can permit greater withdrawals by certain users
in certain basins, however). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § § 85-2-506(2)(a), -507(4)(b)
(1979).
29. NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(6) (1979).
30. This phenomenon has been described more fully as follows: "The drop [in water
level] increases the opportunity for recharge from influent streams. It reduces the area of
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The present question is whether such statutes leave any role for
the reasonable groundwater pumping level concept, outside of localized well interference cases. In theory, an absolute prohibition of
mining would end water level decline due to general overdraft. As a
practical matter, however, where data on total recharge and discharge
have not previously been established, proof of mining may
entail an
3
expensive and uncertain contest between expert witnesses. 1
A senior appropriator seeking pumping level protection might well
find a less expensive, speedier, and more certain remedy under a reasonable pumping level theory. This is especially true if the pumping
level statute has been implemented by detailed administrative regulations and if groundwater aquifer modeling has not yet produced uncontrovertible data regarding mining, i. e., long run total recharge and
discharge figures for the particular area. If a flexible prohibition
against mining were adopted instead of an absolute prohibition, it
would then be necessary to determine how much depletion to allow
before the ban on mining becomes operative. This determination
ought to be influenced at least in part by what a reasonable pumping
level is thought to be. Thus, the reasonable pumping level concept
may be significant under both an absolute and a flexible prohibition
of mining.
Social and Economic Variables
The fact settings in which the reasonable groundwater pumping
level statutes must operate are diverse. The senior appropriator, who
might benefit from pumping level protection, could be a small domestic user. One example would be a family farmer who receives irrigation water from an irrigation district, but because of the poor quality
of that water supplements his supply with a small domestic well. Another would be a widow with six children who has a few acres on the
outskirts of town where she pastures a milk cow and grows vegetables
to feed her family, with water for both irrigation and household needs
coming from a shallow well. Or, the senior appropriator might be an
agricultural, municipal, industrial, or recreational user of varying size
and economic capability.
seep lands and uneconomic losses through consumptive use and evaporation. It provides
opportunity for penetration of rain falling on the valley floors, which under normal conditions did not happen because the groundwater levels were too high. It also increases the opportunity for underflow into the reservoir by increasing the gradient." Muckel, supra note
14, at 294-95. See also D. TODD, supra note 14, at 212-13; W. WALTON, supra note 15, at
607. For a nonappropriation doctrine case taking account of this phenomenon, see City of
Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1975).
31. For an example of widely divergent expert testimony regarding groundwater recharge and discharge, see Tappan v. Smith, 92 Idaho 451, 444 P.2d 412 (1968).
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The junior appropriator, who might oppose pumping level protection for the senior, could be either a single small user whose well is
simply too close or a large operator using the water for anything from
municipal needs to energy production. Instead of a single junior
appropriator, a number of junior wells in the aggregate may cause or
threaten water level decline.
In an extreme case, a senior appropriator might be unable to afford
additional groundwater extraction costs and be facing cessation of
water use if not loss of occupancy of arid land that is worthless or
uninhabitable without water. At the other extreme, junior and senior
well owners might operate competing profitable businesses and be
fighting over comparative economic advantage in production costs.
Which, if any, of these social and economic factors should be taken
into account in setting reasonable groundwater pumping levels and
how should they be weighed? A logical starting point in the search
for answers is an analysis of the language of the present pumping
level statutes.
EXISTING STATUTES

AppropriationDoctrineStates with the Reasonable Pumping
Level Approach
The appropriation doctrine governs both underground streams and
percolating ground water in Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.' 2 All but New Mexico and Utah
have some variety of reasonable pumping level statute. 3 3
32. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § § 37-90-102,-92-102
(1973); IDAHO CODE § § 42-226, -229, -230 (1977 & Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. § § 82a703, -707 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § § 85-2-101, -102(14) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 534.020 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 72-12-1, -18 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6101-01 (1960); OR. REV. STAT. § § 537.515, .525, .535 (1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § § 46-6-1 to -3 (1967 & Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (1953); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § § 90.44.020, .035, .040 (1962 & Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. § § 41-3901, -905, -930, -936 (1977).
As of April 16, 1979, it was still an open question in Colorado whether groundwater not
tributary to a natural stream and not located within any designated groundwater basin is
governed by the appropriation doctrine. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Huston, 42 Colo. App. 52, 593 P.2d 1347 (1979).
33. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.050 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § § 37-90-102,-107(3)(5), -1 1(1)(b) (1973) (designated groundwater areas); IDAHO CODE § § 42-226,-237a(g)
(Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. § § 82a-711, -711a (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-401(1),
-508, -511 (1979) (controlled groundwater areas); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(4), (5),
(7) (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.3 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § § 537.525(7)(8), .620(3), .685(2) (1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-6.1 (Supp. 1980); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.070 (1962); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-933 (1977).
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Even New Mexico and Utah probably could employ the reasonable
pumping level concept, if desired, without new legislation specifically
authorizing it. A New Mexico statute prohibits the impairment of
existing water rights within basins declared by the state engineer to
have reasonably ascertainable boundaries.3 4 Although this statute has
been construed to allow controlled mining in a nonrechargeable
basin, 3 I it could equally well function as a reasonable pumping level
statute in an appropriate case. 3 6 Traditionally, Utah has protected a
senior appropriator's means of diversion without regard to its reasonableness, 3 I but the Utah court may now be moving toward a reasonable means of diversion approach. 3 8
Although the Colorado statute is limited to designated groundwater, see note 68 infra,
no permit may issue for a well outside a designated groundwater area which would tap nontributary water if it would "materially injure" existing water rights. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-90-137(2), (4) (1973). This statute could, if desired, readily be interpreted to mean
that the unreasonable lowering of water level constitutes a material injury. Cf id. § 37-90107(3)-(5) (1973) (defining "unreasonable impairment" in designated groundwater areas to
"include the unreasonable lowering of the water level... beyond reasonable economic limit
of withdrawal"). Another Colorado statute that is at least arguably applicable to much tributary groundwater, whether within or outside a designated area, requires each appropriator
to establish "some reasonable means of effectuating his diversion." Id. § 37-92-102(2)(b)
(1973).
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3E (1978). Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d
708 (1962), held that the statute prohibits any impairment of a senior right rather than only
substantial impairment. Under City of Roswell v. Berry, 80 N.M. 110, 452 P.2d 179 (1969),
however, a "negligible effect" on the water quality in a senior well does not constitute impairment. Impairment is a legal conclusion declared by the court when additional pumping
is not allowed. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-20 (1978) (no permit required to appropriate except in basins declared to have reasonably ascertainable boundaries).
35. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966). This case is discussed in
the text accompanying note 25 supra.
36. Although the court in Mathers, id., said that a decline in water level with resultant
increase in pumping costs does not necessarily constitute an impairment, the court emphasized that the question of impairment must turn upon the facts in each case. Presumably the
rate of decline of pumping level would have to be reasonable under all of the circumstances.
Cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-107(5) (1973) ("impairment shall include the unreasonable lowering of the water level ...beyond reasonable economic limits of withdrawal or
use"); KAN. STAT. § 82a-711 (1977) ("impairment shall include the unreasonable... lowering of the static water level ... beyond a reasonable economic limit").
37. Current Creek Irrig. Co. v. Andrews, 9 Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959); Hanson
v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949);Protection,supra note 1.
38. See Wayman v. Murray City, 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861 (1969). The narrow holding of this case is that a junior appropriator is not entitled to absolute protection of means
of diversion when the owner of several old wells wishes to switch to a single new well. Although the court distinguished Current Creek Irrig. Co. v. Andrews, 9 Utah 2d 324, 344
P.2d 528 (1959), some have read Wayman as signaling a general change in attitude toward
the means of diversion problem in Utah. Clark, Arizona Ground Water Law: The Need for
Legislation, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 811 (1974); South Dakota's Artesian Pressure, supra
note 6, at 489; Comment, Towards an Economic Distributionof Water Rights, 1970 UTAH
L. REV. 442, 444.
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Artesian Pressure
Although some of the reasonable pumping level statutes are silent
about artesian pressure,3 this silence should not necessarily foreclose legal protection of diversion systems using a combination of
artesian pressure and pumping to lift groundwater to the surface.
Two of those statutes are phrased to protect only reasonable pumping
levels, however; 4 and arguably they imply that a means of diversion
consisting wholly of artesian pressure, i.e., a flowing artesian well, is
per se unreasonable.4 1
Other statutes do expressly mention artesian pressure. 4 2 They stop
short of guaranteeing that the owners of flowing wells will never have
to install pumps, however.4" The best that can be said for flowing
artesian wells, under the most favorable of the statutes, is that in
unique circumstances such a means of diversion might qualify as reasonable. 44 In the main, however, the statutes seem to contemplate
the use of pumps, either exclusively or in conjunction with artesian
pressure.
39. COLO. REV. STAT. § § 37-90-102, -107(3)-(5), -l11(1)(b) (1973); IDAHO CODE
§ § 42-226, -237a(g) (1977 & Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. § § 82a-711, -711a (1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 534.110(4) (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § § 535.525(7)-(8), .620(3), .685(2)
(1979).
40. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-102, -11l(1)(b) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 42-226
(Supp. 1980).
41. It seems unlikely that these statutes would be construed as reaching only pump
wells and not declaring policy, one way or the other, for flowing artesian wells. Colorado and
Idaho statutes do recognize the existence of artesian wells by requiring them to be equipped
with valves to prevent wasteful flows. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-110(1) (1973); IDAHO
CODE § § 42-1601 to -1605 (1977). This recognition does not necessarily mean, however,
that such diversion systems are entitled to protection against interference from subsequent
wells. Compare WYO. STAT. § 41-3-909(a)(vii) with § 41-3-933 (1977).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.050 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § § 85-2-401(1), -508
(1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.3 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 46-6-6.1 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.070 (1962); WYO. STAT.
§ 41-3-933 (1977).
43. Prior to 1972, the South Dakota water commission protected artesian pressure diversion systems apparently without exception. See South Dakota's Artesian Pressure, supra
note 6, at 484-85 (1971). The current law expressly disavows "the necessity of requiring
maintenance of artesian head pressure in a domestic use well." S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 46-6-6.1 (Supp. 1980).
44. See Interlocutory Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 6-7, 12, Dep't of Natural
Resources & Conservation v. Crumpled Horn, No. 7076 (Mont. 9th Jud. Dist. May 16, 1978).
There the lessee of what the court called a "free flowing " stockwater well was awarded
damages against a junior groundwater appropriator whose withdrawals dried up the senior
well. The damages were for the cost of a pump, cement, and electricity for ten years.
Artesian pressure had raised water in the well casing to within about two feet of the surface. The lessee tapped the well casing with a buried pipe about six feet below the surface
which ran downhill to a coulee where a stockwater facility was situated. Telephone interview with Laurence Siroky, Chief of the Water Rights Bureau, Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation (September 27, 1979). Mr. Siroky reports that no appeal
has yet been taken in the case and none is expected.
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Water Level Versus Pumping Lift
Some of the statutes refer to water level in the ground, 4 S while
others focus more upon pumping lift to the surface. 4 6 For example,
a Kansas statute authorizes "a reasonable ... lowering of the static
water level," 4 while a Washington statute is worded to protect "a
reasonable or feasible pumping lift." 4 Any thought that the Washington language might indicate more concern than the Kansas language about the economics of lifting water to the surface is dispelled,
however, by the further direction in the Kansas statute that the state
engineer must consider the economics of pumping groundwater for
the uses involved when he determines reasonable static water levels.
Furthermore, even though the Washington statute speaks of pump
lift rather than static water level, administrative regulations issued for
at least one groundwater management subarea in Washington are
worded in terms of static water level. 4 9
The water level approach may be less complex, or at any rate less
ambiguous, than the pumping lift approach in one respect. In determining the pumping lift of an existing well, what are the beginning
and ending points of the measurement? Should the beginning point
be affected by whether a well is located on a hill in a valley? What if
the well is situated below the high point of land to be irrigated and
additional surface pumping is needed to get the water to part of the
land? How far down should the measurement go-to the static water
table, to the bottom of the cone of depression, or to some other
point? If the measurement includes the drawdown caused by operation of a pump, decision would be required about permissible well
efficiency because the drawdown of a well is in part a function of its
efficiency. Also localized differences in transmissibility within an
aquifer can produce significant variations in drawdown. To what extent should that be taken into account? In contrast, a statute worded
in terms of water level, especially static water level, may more readily
45. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.050 (1977); KAN. STAT. § 82a-711, -711a (1977);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-401(1) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(4) (1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.3 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.525(7) (1979); WYO.
STAT. § 41-3-933 (1977).
46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1980);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.070 (1962).
47. KAN. STAT. § 82a-711a (1977).
48. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.070 (1962).
49. The Odessa subarea regulations seek to prevent water level decline of more than 300
feet below the static water level as measured in 1967. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-130-070
(1977). It should perhaps be added, however, that these regulations were issued under an entire chapter of the Washington Code, chapter 90.44, which includes a safe-sustained-yield
statute as well as the reasonable pump lift statute..
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invite simpler calculation based on a groundwater level unaffected by
recent pumping.' 0
Modification of ProtectedPumping Levels
Reasonable pumping level statutes tend to be silent about modification of levels over time. In Idaho the court has said in dictum,
however, that the state pumping level legislation implicitly contemplates modification to conform to changing circumstances."' The
court's position seems sensible and may become a standard approach.
Coping with change in the pumping level context has a parallel in
existing nonconforming uses under zoning law. In both cases the
existing use, for example the uncommonly shallow well and the
plumbing supply shop in a residential neighborhood, may be disharmonious if not totally incompatible with the plan for the area. The
zoning law technique of amortization allows an inappropriate land
use to continue without change for a fixed period, such as five years,
after which it must terminate and the use must thereafter conform
to the zoning for the area.' 2 This gives the landowner time to recoup
on his investment in existing facilities and to prepare for the change.
view is that zoning amortization proThe strongly prevailing modem
5
visions are valid if reasonable. 3
The zoning amortization analogy has its limitations, however. First,
so many variables affect the question of reasonableness' I that predicting results in specific fact situations from prior case law is difficult. Second, appropriation doctrine states commonly allow a change
in the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use of a water
50. KAN. ADMIN. REG. 5-1-1(v) (1978) defines static water level as "[t] he depth of
the top of the groundwater level below land surface which is not affected by recent pumpage." The static water level will not necessarily be uniform over a geographical area because,
although the water table conforms generally to the topography of the overlying land, it does
so in a flattened or subdued manner. Crosby, supra note 7, at 79.
51. Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 584, 513 P.2d 627, 636 (1973).
52. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW § 88 (1971).
53. See id.; P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 41.04[21 (1978).
For an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the case law, see 4 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE PUBLIC POWER § § 116.01-.11 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Art Neon Co. v. Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 932 (1974) (a nonconforming advertising sign): "In the application of the reasonableness test ... the courts have used a variety of factors and combinations thereof. These include the nature of the nonconforming use, the character of the structure, the location,
what part of the individual's total business is concerned, the time periods, salvage, depreciation for income tax purposes, and depreciation for other purposes, and the monpoly or advantage, if any, resulting from the fact that similar new structures are prohibited in the same
area. Where signs are concerned, the courts usually also mention the fact that the use is also
of public streets since the message is directed to the passerby."
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right only so far as other appropriators will not be injured.' ' Suppose
that after the amortization period for a shallow well passes, its owner
cannot afford to pump from the new, lower water level for the same
use as before. In addition, assume that any economically feasible
change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use will injure nearby wells or that the cost of gathering data to prove no injury
would be prohibitive. Though appropriation doctrine water rights are
subject to police power regulation, they are generally regarded as
property that cannot be taken without just compensation.5 6 Has a
vested water right been taken by the pumping level amortization?5
Although this precise question has not been litigated, a roughly
parallel question in zoning law has: Is a vested property right taken
by a zoning amortization ordinance that phases out the right to maintain a nonconforming building that cannot economically be moved
or remodeled to conform? The zoning cases that involve substantial
structures-rather than mere nonconforming use of unimproved land,
outdoor advertising signs, junkyards, and the like-generally have required a fairly long amortization period to survive constitutional
challenge." 8 Thus, if a water right at a shallow well cannot readily be
changed in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use to enable continued exercise of it, a short amortization period may be
constitutionally suspect.
A recent trial court decision from Montana took an approach akin
to amortization, although no future period of use was involved. The
court held a junior appropriator liable for causing increased pumping
costs at two senior wells. The owner of a third senior well using what
the court called a cement well pit was denied damages for the cost of
a new well and pump, however, because that well was more than 30
years old and the "evidence indicates that wells of this type are depreciated out by this time."' I
FactorsBearing on Reasonableness
Perhaps the most striking common feature of the reasonable pumping level statutes is their lack of specific guidance regarding the mea55. See 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 623-44 (1972).
56. 4 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 304.4(B) (R. Clark ed. 1970).
57. For discussion of a similar problem, finding a probable taking, see Carlson, Report
to Governor John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Problems, 50 DEN. L. J. 293, 340-42
(1973).

58. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 52; P. ROHAN, supra note 53; N. WILLIAMS, supra
note 53. Perhaps the period may even have to be related to the remaining economic life of

the structure.
59. Interlocutory Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 4, Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation v. Crumpled Horn, No. 7076 (Mont. 9th Jud. Dist. May 16, 1978).
No appeal has been taken; see note 44 supra.
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sure of reasonableness. The scant express statutory guidance that is
available is analyzed below.
Economics
A number of the pumping level statutes indicate that economic
factors should affect the measure of reasonableness. 6 0 The economic
concerns fall into two categories: (1) protecting senior appropriators
against water level decline beyond their economic capacity to continue to pump, and (2) achieving overall economic development of
the groundwater resource. These concerns are likely to be important
regardless of whether a particular pumping level statute mentions
them.
For example, the Alaska pumping level statute,6" which has been
copied almost verbatim in Montana and North Dakota, 6 2 permits the
lowering of artesian pressure if prior appropriators can "reasonably"
acquire their water under the changed conditions. Although the statute does not delineate factors bearing on reasonableness, commentary
on it by its principal draftsman indicates an economic component to
the standard: " 'Unreasonable' changes in water conditions seem to
be those in which later appropriators with superior economic capacity
such as power companies or cities impose costs 'beyond the economic
reach' of smaller appropriators such as irrigators."'6 3 Another Alaska
statute invites consideration of overall economic development by declaring a policy of managing water "to enhance ... the overall eco-

nomic... well-being" of Alaskans.6 Even without this latter statute,
the same policy may well be implicit in the appropriation doctrine in
view of its historic function of promoting economic development. 65
The two kinds of economic concerns stated above were evident in
a recent trial court decision from Montana. The judge decided that
the defendant's junior well affected "some of the senior appropriators to the extent that it is not economical, practical, or convenient
for... [them to pay added groundwater withdrawal costs] consider60. COLO. REV. STAT. § § 37-90-102, -107(5), -111(l)(a) (1973); IDAHO CODE
§ 42-226 (Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. § § 82a-711, -711a (1977); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 534.110(4) (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.525(8) (1979).
61. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.050 (1977).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-401(1) (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.3
(Supp. 1979).
63. Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 35 (1967); cf
C. CORKER, supra note 2, at xviii ("To be meaningful, 'reasonable pump lift' must recognize economic values of water.").
64. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.010(a) (1977).
65. For discussion of the policy of promoting economic development by affording security of investment, see notes 109-10 and accompanying text infra.
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ing their historical means of appropriation." 6 6 In an accompanying
opinion, the judge referred to a general Montana statute declaring a
policy of encouraging the development and conservation of the
waters of the state for the maximum benefit of its people. 6 Thus,
he seemed concerned with both the economic capacity of individual
senior appropriators and overall development of water.
The Colorado and Idaho pumping level statutes, in closely similar
language, recognize potential tension between protecting the diversion systems of senior appropriators and overall economic development of groundwater. 6 8 The Idaho statute provides "[W]hile the
doctrine of 'first in time is first in right' is recognized, a reasonable
exercise of this right shall not block full economic development of
underground water resources, but early appropriators shall be protected in the maintenance of reasonable groundwater pumping
levels. ..

."

Although this tension is not expressly recognized by stat-

ute in many states, it is often likely to be at the heart of pumping
level issues regardless of the specific statutory structure in a given
jurisdiction.
The tension cannot be resolved without determining how subjectively the economic limits of senior appropriators should be judged.
The more subjectively the economic limit criterion is applied, the
greater is the potential impediment to aggregate economic development of groundwater. A common law appropriation doctrine case
from Colorado illustrates the problem. In City of Colorado Springs v.
Bender," 9 the plaintiffs irrigated approximately 50 acres of pasture
and cultivated land under a senior groundwater right. They sought to
enjoin junior appropriators from lowering the water table below the
intake of their pumping facilities. The state supreme court held that
priority of appropriation does not give a right to an inefficient means
of diversion, and it remanded the case for determination of the level
66. Interlocutory Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 11, Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation v. Crumpled Horn, No. 7076 (Mont. 9th Jud. Dist. May 16, 1978)
(emphasis added).
67. Memorandum Opinion 1, Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation v. Crumpled
Horn, No. 7076 (Mont. 9th Jud. Dist. May 16, 1978). The statute, then designated as MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 89-866(3) (Supp. 1977), has since been recodified as MONT. CODE
ANN. § 85-1-101(2) (1979). Curiously, the judge never mentioned Montana's specific pumping level statute. No appeal has been taken in the case; see note 44 supra.
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1980).
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-107(5) (1973).
The Colorado statute is limited to designated groundwater. Basically this is groundwater
within the boundaries of designated geographical areas which is not tributary to a surface
stream. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (1973). It could conceivably include some
tributary groundwater, however. See Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L. J.
226, 317 n. 648 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Colorado Water Law].
69. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
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at which each junior appropriator must cease diverting water to meet
the demands of a senior appropriator. It instructed the trial court
that
the conditions surrounding the diversion by the senior appropriator
must be examined as to whether he has created a means of diversion
from the aquifer which is reasonably adequate for the use to which
he has historically put the water of his appropriation....
...[Senior appropriators] cannot be required to improve their
extraction facilities beyond their economic reach, upon a consideration of all the factors involved. 70
Although the supreme court did not list the factors to be considered,
one seems to be the plaintiffs' historical use of water. Query, however, whether their historical use was irrigation or small scale irrigation? In other words, if economies of scale would enable a 400-acre
irrigator to pump from a much greater depth than a 50-acre irrigator,
is it relevant that the plaintiffs historically were 50-acre irrigators?
A few years after the Bender decision, Colorado enacted its present
legislation which calls for full economic development of designated
groundwater while at the same time protecting senior appropriators
against the lowering of water levels below reasonable economic limits
of withdrawal.' I Although the groundwater in Bender probably
would not have constituted designated groundwater under the subsequent legislation, the parallel between the statutory concern with
economic limits of2 withdrawal and the economic reach language of
7
Bender is obvious.
Bender seems to have contemplated a subjective or personal approach in determining the economic reach of an appropriator. 7 3
Arguably, the legislation forecloses so subjective a view of a senior
appropriator's economic capability. The legislation states it shall not
"be construed as entitling any prior designated ground water appropriator to the maintenance of the historic water level or any other
level below which water still can be economically extracted when the
total economic pattern of the particular designated ground water
70. Id., 366 P.2d at 556 (emphasis added).
71. See note 68, supra for the definition of designated groundwater.
72. A commentator has said that the legislation "codified the principle of reasonable
diversion by adopting some of the language of the Bender case." Colorado Water Law, supra
note 68, at 335.
73. "The [Bender] opinion refers to two types of economic information-'financial resources' and the 'high values' which are produced by the water use .... Does the court's reference to financial resources mean that the lower court must hear evidence on the capital
reserves or savings accounts of the well owners? Apparently so." Widman, supra note 1, at

540.
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basin is considered." '74 If a 50-acre irrigator does not fit into the
total economic pattern of the basin, apparently his inherent economic limitations on depth of withdrawal due to the size of his operation should not be given much weight.7" Kansas and Nevada have
similar statutory provisions tending to preclude a highly subjective
approach.7 6
Variations in statutory language could affect the weight given the
competing concerns of protecting early appropriators in their investments and developing groundwater. As noted earlier, the Alaska
pumping level statute focuses on assuring that senior appropriators
will be able reasonably to continue to withdraw water, although
Alaska also has a more general statutory policy of enhancing the
overall economic well-being of Alaskans. 77 The Wyoming pumping
level statute, in contrast, focuses on managing water levels to achieve
"maximum beneficial use of the water in the source of supply."' 78
While the phrase "maximum beneficial use" may be somewhat flexible, 7 9 it is doubtful given the traditional understanding of beneficial
use 80 that the statutory language should include the pump lift benefits to senior appropriators from leaving more water in the ground.
At any rate, the pumping level statute itself does not express concern
about continued operation by senior appropriators with a shallow
economic reach. Arguably such concern is implicit, to a degree at
least, from the appropriation doctrine tradition of fostering economic
development by affording security of investment in water facilities. 8 I
In sum, the Alaska pumping level statute focuses upon reasonable
protection for senior appropriators, with probably some interplay
from a more general statutory declaration of a policy of overall economic development. The Wyoming pumping level statute focuses
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111(1)(a) (1973) (emphasis added).
75. Especially is this so if the language italicized in the text is read together with the declared state policy of full economic development. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973).
76. See KAN. STAT. § 82a-711 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(4) (1979).

77. See notes 61 and 64 and accompanying text supra.
78. WYO. STAT. § 41-3-933 (1977).
79. The original draft of the bill for this statute used the words "maximum economic
development" rather than "maximum beneficial use." F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 515 (3d ed. 1979). The latter phrase would seem to be broader in
scope than the former.
80. See generally 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 54.3 (R. Clark ed. 1967); 1 W.
HUTCHINS, supra note 55, at 522-46.
81. See generally Hutchins, Legal Ground Water Problems in the West, 22 NATIONAL
RECLAMATION ASS'N. PROC. 81, 82 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Legal Ground Water
Problems]. For further discussion of the policy of promoting economic development by
affording security of investment, see notes 109-10 and accompanying text infra. Various departures from the priority principle in Wyoming may weaken the historic importance of security of investment, however. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text infra.
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upon maximum beneficial use of groundwater, with perhaps some
interplay from the appropriation doctrine tradition of affording security of investment to early appropriators. Whether these variations
in statutory pattern will in fact produce differing results in similar
cases, though, remains to be seen.
Another factor that may affect the tension between recognizing
the economic limits of senior appropriators and overall economic development is the extent of a state's commitment to the rule that
priority in time gives priority in right. Although the priority principle
is fundamental to the appropriation doctrine,8 2 not all appropriation
doctrine states are equally committed to it. To whatever extent the
policy against allowing water levels to fall below the economic limits
of senior appropriators is based on the notion that priority in time
should give some special right or benefit, 8 3 states with a weaker
commitment to the priority principle in other aspects of groundwater
management may be expected to give less protection to small senior
appropriators in their means of diversion systems.
Wyoming, for example, seems to have a relatively weak commitment to the priority principle as it applies to groundwater. One statute authorizes the state engineer to cope with insufficiency of supply
in groundwater control areas 8 4 through a system of rotation if "cessation or reduction of withdrawals by junior appropriators will not
result in proportionate benefits to senior appropriators." 8 5 Depending upon the interpretation given "proportionate benefits," this statute could produce results differing significantly from strict adherence
to the rule that priority in time gives priority in right.8 6 Another
statute declares that domestic and stock use wells "shall have a pre82. See 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 55, at 396.
83. See A. MAASS & R. ANDERSON .... AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE:
CONFLICT, GROWTH AND JUSTICE IN ARID ENVIRONMENTS 3 (1978) ("The 'first in
time, first in right' principle has been accepted, apparently, because of a widespread belief
that man is entitled to the product of his own labor and therefore to protection against latecomers of land he has worked.") See also E. MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 65
(1907).
84. Control areas may be designated in any of the following situations: "(i) The use of
underground water is approaching a use equal to the current recharge rate; (ii) Ground water
levels are declining or have declined excessively; (iii) Conflicts between users are occurring
or are foreseeable; (iv) The waste of water is occurring or may occur; or (v) Other conditions
exist or may arise that require regulation for the protection of the public interest." WYO.
STAT. § 41-3-912 (1977).
85. Id. § 41-3-915(a)(iv) (1977).
86. The more typical appropriation doctrine approach has been codified in the Colorado
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 as follows: "No reduction of
any lawful diversion because of the operation of the priority system shall be permitted unless
such reduction would increase the amount of water available to and required by water rights
having senior priorities." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(2)(d) (1973). See generally 1 W.
HUTCHINS, supra note 55, at 567-83.
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ferred right over rights for all other uses, regardless of their dates of
priority, subject to the provisions of section [41-3-911] .. Section 41-3-911 then provides in part:
Whenever a well withdrawing water for beneficial purposes shall
interfere unreasonably with an adequate well developed solely for
domestic or stock uses ... the state engineer may, on the complaint

of the operator of the stock or domestic well, order the interfering
appropriator to cease or reduce withdrawals of underground water,
unless such appropriator shall furnish at his own expense, sufficient
water at the former place of use to meet the need for domestic or
stock use. In case of interference between two (2) wells utilizing
water for stock or domestic use ... the appropriation with the

earliest [sic] priority shall have the better right.
Returning to some of the fact situations mentioned earlier,' 8 the
family farmer and the widow with domestic wells should continue to
receive water so long as each has "an adequate well," despite withdrawals by larger appropriators. If that is so, however, it is not because of their priority in time, but because of the nature of their
uses. A small irrigator with a senior groundwater appropriation would
seem not to fare as well.
A number of other states also have statutes that depart from the
priority principle. 8 9 The most common departure is a preference for
domestic or certain other uses.
In addition to departing from the priority principle, preferred
status for some water uses may affect the tension between protecting
early appropriators and overall economic development in another
way. For example, Oregon empowers its water resources director to
designate preferred uses in certain areas and to deny or limit permits
for new wells that would cause "undue interference" with existing
wells.9 0 Where domestic use has been designated a preferred status,
arguably the economic reach of domestic users should be highly significiant in deciding what constitutes undue interference in those
87. WYO. STAT. § 41-3-907 (1977).
88. See pages 7 through 8 supra.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-507(4)(c), (0 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.120(2)
(1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.735(3)(c) (1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-6.2
(Supp. 1979). In a case now on appeal, an Idaho district judge ruled that domestic wells
were exempted by IDAHO CODE § 42-227 (1977) (subsequently amended by 1978 Idaho
Sess. Laws, ch. 324, § 1) from the reasonable pumping level provisions of the state ground
water code. Parker v. Wallentine, No. 2930 (Idaho 6th Jud. Dist. June 23, 1977, & August
20, 1979) (orders granting temporary and permanent injunctions), appeal docketed, No.
13482 (Idaho Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 1979).
90. OR. REV. STAT. § § 537.620(3), .735(3)(c) (1979).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

areas. 9 1 Nevada has a similar statutory scheme, 9 2 but adds an apparently unique provision to minimize the impediment to further
groundwater development due to preferred status for domestic wells.
The state engineer is authorized to prohibit new domestic wells in
areas where water can be furnished by an entity such as a water district or a municipality.9
Other Factors
While few reasonable pumping level statutes refer to factors other
than economics that should affect pumping levels, in most states
other statutes can give some guidance on other factors. Only some
pumping level statutes explicitly mention water quality, 9 4 but more
generally applicable water quality statutes might require or at least
authorize consideration of this factor.9 1 An occasional statute indicates that pumping level regulation should take into account the
effect upon senior surface water rights. 9 6 Again, the same may arguably be compelled or authorized by more general laws in some states
regarding coordinated management of surface water and groundwater. 9 7 Finally, as already noted, some western water codes contain
preferences for domestic and other uses.
Summary
An administrative agency or court undertaking to make decisions
under a reasonable pumping level statute must know what factors to
consider and how to weigh them. The existing pumping level statutes
vary in the express guidance they give. A number of them refer to
economic factors. Some declare a policy of full economic develop-

91. Cf Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978) (statutory preference
for domestic use in a jurisdiction having a combination of the reasonable use and correlative

rights doctrine relied upon to find unreasonable harm in a well interference case).
92. NEV. REV. STAT. § § 534.110(7), .120(2), (3)(c) (1979).
93. NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.120(3)(d) (1979).
94. KAN. STAT. § 82a-711 (1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.525(8) (1977).
95. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § § 46.03.010, .020(10), .060, .070 (1977 & Supp. 1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.020(2) (1979). See also C. CORKER, supra note 2, at ch. V n. 89.
96. IDAHO STAT. § 42-237a(g) (Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § § 537.525(9), .620
(3) (1977). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-507(2)(b)(ii) (1979).
97. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § § 46.15.010-.270 (1977) (no distinction made in state
water code between groundwater and surface water); COLO. REV. STAT. § § 37-92-102,
.401, -501 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370(4) (1979), as applied in Griffin v. Westergard, 96 Nev. Adv. Op. 166, 615 P.2d 235 (1980); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-916 (1977). See
generally 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 441 n.30 (R. Clark ed. 1972). The National
Water Commission concluded that in many states laws need to be revised to better take account of the frequent physical interrelationship of surface and groundwater. WATER POLICIES, supra note 16, at 233.
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ment; some express concern about the economic limitations of senior
appropriators. A few recognize potential conflict between the two
types of economic concerns. Some states have water quality, water
administration, or use preference statutes that might figure into
pumping level decisions. Overall, however, the existing pumping level
statutes are incomplete in listing factors, weighting them, or declaring
policy with specificity. If further guidance on economic and other
factors is to be found, it must come from probing more deeply by
searching for goals that underlie the statutes.
UNDERLYING ECONOMIC GOALS
Economic factors loom so large in pumping level management that
it is appropriate to begin the effort to fill gaps in express statutory
directives by exploring the economic goals implicit in reasonable
pumping level statutes and related features of appropriation doctrine
law. Variations exist among states, of course, and identifying a particular theme in some states is no guarantee that the theme holds in yet
another state. The purpose of the following discussion is to catalog
economic concerns to help agencies and courts focus on the right
questions when they seek to implement the measure of reasonableness in a particular jurisdiction.
A HistoricalPerspective
Preventing or Curtailing Overdevelopment
The western water law doctrine of prior appropriation developed in
the mid-nineteenth century as a means of allocating rights in surface
streams.9 8 Although it was soon applied to underground streams,9 9
no strong movement emerged to extend the doctrine to other groundwater that percolated through the soil without forming an underground stream' 0 until the second quarter of the twentieth century.1 0 1 Before that, percolating water was governed by several
rules, namely, the absolute ownership doctrine, the rule of reason-

98. See F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 21-29 (1971).
See also 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.1 (R. Clark ed. 1967); 1 W. HUTCHINS,
supra note 55, at 159-65.
99. See J. GOULD, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS § 281 (2d ed. 1891);J.
LONG, IRRIGATION § 43 (2d ed. 1916).
100. See note 16 supra.
101. Major water law treatises published in 1911 and 1912 reported that the appropriation doctrine was inapplicable to percolating groundwater. 2 C. KINNEY, LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 1190 (2d ed. 1912); 2 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES § 1106 (3d ed. 1911).
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able use, and the correlative rights doctrine.' 02 A number of western
states that now have the appropriation doctrine for all groundwater
initially adopted or inclined toward adopting one of these other rules
for percolating water.1 03
Many western states extended the appropriation doctrine to perco1
lating water primarily to regulate overdevelopment of such water. 04
The priority principle of that doctrine can prevent overdevelopmnent
when supplemented by a system which requires a permit to appropriate and denies new permits once a desired level of development is
reached. That principle can also curtail overdevelopment by forcing
closure of wells in inverse order of priority until the desired reduction is reached.' 05 Whether the objective is preventing overdevelopment or reducing it, however, some standard is needed to determine
the point of overdevelopment. Unless a senior appropriator is guaranteed not only the right to a given quantity of water but also his his-

toric means of diversion, the priority principle alone cannot define
when overdevelopment occurs.
The issue of protecting senior means of diversion has arisen with

surface streams as well as groundwater;'

06

with surface water, how-

ever, development is often limited simply by the amount of water
flowing in a stream in a given year. Groundwater aquifers, in contrast, typically contain large quantities of storage accumulated over
many years. This storage feature eliminates the possibility of a simple
physical limit on withdrawals in a given year.'07 Since the problem
is more complex with groundwater, it has attracted special legislative
102. These doctrines have been explained and analyzed at length by a number of writers.
See, e.g., 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § § 28.65-.68 (A. Casner ed. 1954); 5 R.
725-27 (1968); Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New
POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 621 (1970).
103. See 2 S. WIEL, supra note 101, at § § 1039, 1066; Kirkwood, Appropriation of
Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2, n.4 (1948). An exhaustive collection of early percolating water cases appears in Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1385, 1390-98 (1928).
104. See WATER POLICIES, supra note 16, at 231. A number of detailed accounts of
the extension of the appropriation doctrine to percolating ground water are available. See,
e.g., Clark, Groundwater Legislation in the Light of Experience in the Western States, 22
MONT. L. REV. 42 (1960); Dunbar, The Adaptation of Groundwater- Control Institutions
to the Arid West, 51 AG. HIST.. 662 (1977); Hutchins, Ground Water Legislation, 30
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 416 (1958); Legal Ground Water Problems, supra note 81, at 81.
105. But ef WATER POLICIES, supra note 16, at 231-32 (suggesting this theory usually
does not work out in practice). For a court order putting the theory into practice, see Baker
v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973). The situation continued to be
litigated, however, in Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 546 P.2d
382 (1976).
106. E.g. Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal.2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1925); Crowley v.
District Court, 108 Mont. 89, 88 P.2d 23 (1939).
107. C. CORKER, supra note 2, at ix, 106-07. For discussion of other differences between groundwater and surface water management, see id. at 148-49, 152. Cf Colorado
Ground Water Comm'n v. Dreiling, 606 P.2d 836, 939 (1980) ("Under the appropriation
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attention. The enactment of reasonable pumping level legislation sets
a standard limiting development of groundwater, which can then be
implemented through the priority principle.' o8
Promoting Development
The appropriation doctrine has long been characterized by a policy
of promoting water development by giving security to investors in
such development. As the Wyoming court put it in 1896, "The climate is dry. The soil is arid, and largely unproductive in the absence
of irrigation.... Irrigation... cannot be accomplished with any degree of success or permanency without the right to divert and appropriate water of natural streams for that purpose and a security afforded to that right."'

09

In fact, a study prepared for the National

Water Commission concluded that the prime reason for the continued
vitality of the appropriation doctrine is the economic development
goal it accomplishes.' 1

0

Although the tradition of promoting development through security
of investment began with surface streams, that policy was later extended to underground waters. The rule of absolute ownership, which
dominated percolating groundwater law in this country during the
last half of the nineteenth century,' ' freely allows a landowner to
extract groundwater without regard for the impact upon a neighbor's
well.' I 2 The doctrine fails to protect well owners in their source of
supply, an important factor in its eventual rejection by most states. 13
doctrine as applied to the waters of a natural stream, a person is entitled to appropriate
When applied to designated groundwater so long as there is any water in the stream....
waters, however, that doctrine is modified to allow only appropriation to the point of reasonable depletion....").
108. The reasonable pumping level concept is, of course, not the only tool for coping
with overdevelopment. Another important, but not unrelated tool, is legislative policy on
groundwater mining. See discussion at pages 5 through 7 supra.
109. Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 318-19, 44 P.845, 847 (1896) (emphasis added).
110. C. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 6 (1971).
111. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 102, at 725 reports that prior to 1922, 28 states had
at one time accepted the rule, although less than half of them continue to do so.
112. The water may not be extracted for a malicious purpose or allowed to go to waste.
F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA
EXPERIENCE § 54.2(a) (1968). Texas, an absolute ownership state, recently held that a
well owner is liable to neighbors for land subsidence caused by negligence in extracting
groundwater. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.
1978) (decision given prospective effect only).
113. See SELECTED PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 158. Other factors were disenchantment with the absolute ownership tenets that (1) the movement of percolating water was so
occult and concealed that no workable regulatory system could be devised, (2) a person
should have the same ownership rights in water under his land as in soil and rocks, and (3)
limiting groundwater withdrawals would interfere with drainage necessary for mining, road
construction, agriculture, etc. See, e.g., Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A.
379 (1909).
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Fear was expressed that people would not invest to develop wells if a
neighbor might later sink a deep well that would dry up the earlier
well.1 14 In contrast the reasonable use rule, which became popular
during the early part of the twentieth century,' 1 5 provides a measure of protection. It allows one well owner to interfere with another's well only if his use is reasonable. 116 The rule was construed,
however, to allow an owner of land overlying the source of supply to
commence a nonwasteful use of water on that land at any time despite interference with neighboring wells. Thus, appropriation doctrine advocates came to criticize the reasonable use doctrine for failing to provide enough security of investment.' 17
While a number of western states extended the appropriation doctrine to percolating groundwater and added a reasonable pumping
level concept primarily to control overdevelopment rather than promote new development, the reverse appears to have been true in
other states. In Idaho, at least, there is strong evidence of concern
about promoting more groundwater development. In 1933 the Idaho
court had held' 18 that under the common law of appropriation a
senior well owner's historic means of diversion was protected against
interference without regard to its reasonableness.' '9 The court's approach soon drew strong criticism from a commentator in an engineering journal on the ground that it would impede water development: "[I] n many areas the first appropriator could require damages
from every subsequent appropriator and each subsequent appropriator, in turn of priority, could require damages from all later appropriators, until the last one would have to pay tribute to all.' 20 At
the annual state bar meeting in 1949, a leading authority on Idaho
water law discussed the need for a groundwater code. He made the
114. E.g., Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909).
115. See 2 S.WIEL, supra note 101, at § 1041; Huffcut, PercolatingWaters: The Rule
of Reasonable User, 13 YALE L. J. 222 (1904).
116. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 17.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967); 5 R. POWELL,

supra note 102, at

726.

117. E.g., NATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING BOARD, REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE WATER LAW, STATE WATER LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

WEST 79 (1943).
118. Noh v. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933).
119. This result was not compelled by precedent because few means of diversion cases
had been decided under the appropriation doctrine. Most of those had involved surface
diversions, and the results were inconclusive, with some cases protecting a senior's means of
diversion only if it was reasonable and others giving protection without concern for the
reasonableness of the means. See SELECTED PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 168-79; Annot.,
121 A.L.R. 1044 (1939).
120. Thompson & Fiedler, Some Problems Relating to Legal Controlof Ground Waters,
30 J. OF AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASS'N. 1049, 1075 (1938). See also SELECTED
PROBLEMS, supra note 6, at 179.
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point that groundwater is "probably... the greatest undeveloped
asset or resource" in the state.' 21
Subsequent statutory enactments in Idaho reflect the same sentiment in favor of development. In 1951 the legislature enacted a
groundwater code affirming earlier judicial adoption of the appropriation doctrine for all groundwater,' 2 2 and two years later it added
while the doctrine of "first in time is first in right" is recognized,
a reasonable exercise of this right shall not block full economic development of underground water resources, but early appropriators
of underground water shall be protected in the maintenance of reasonable ground water pumping levels as may be established by the
state reclamation engineer as herein provided. . 23
...

This statute recognizes (1) stored groundwater is not always used
most economically in providing lift for the wells of early appropriators, and (2) absolute protection of historic means of diversion may
hinder economic development.' 24 The statutory safety valve against
counterproductive security of investment under the priority principle
is the reasonable pumping level concept.
The Idaho experience, then, is quite different from that in western
states having serious groundwater depletion problems when they enacted reasonable pumping level statutes. It seems likely that at least
some other states with relatively abundant and undeveloped groundwater supplies were motivated by the same concern for new development as Idaho when they enacted appropriation doctrine and reasonable pumping level legislation.
In concluding this examination of the economic development tradition of the appropriation doctrine as it relates to groundwater
pumping levels, the following observations by a lawyer-historian are
instructive:
[The rule of priority] was put forth... as an offensive doctrine
justified by its power to promote economic development. In a capital
scarce economy, its proponents urged, the first entrant takes the
121.
(1949).
122.
123.
CODE §

Parry, An Underground Water Code, 23 IDAHO STATE BAR PROCEEDINGS 19
1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 200.
1953 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 182, § 1. This statute is currently in force as IDAHO
42-226 (Supp. 1980).

124. In an article that spawned much legal-economic literature, economist R. H. Coase
argued that legal rules will not affect the efficient allocation of resources if certain conditions are met, such as zero cost in collecting property right transfer data and the accomplishing of transfers. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase's
analysis does not undermine the approach of the Idaho statute because not all the conditions necessary for operation of the Coase theorem are satisfied in the groundwater context.
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greatest risks; without the recognition of a property right in the first
developer-and a concomitant power to exclude subsequent entrants
-there cannot exist the legal and economic certainty necessary to induce investors into a high-risk enterprise.:
The [subsequent] attack on the rule of priority reveals the basic
instability of utilitarian theories of property. As property rights
came to be justified by their efficacy in promoting economic growth,
they also became increasingly vulnerable to the efficiency claims of
newer competing forms of property. Thus, the rule of priority, wearing the mantle of economic development, at first triumphed over natural use. In turn, those property rights acquired on the basis of
priority were soon challenged under a balancing test or "reasonable
newer forms
use" doctrine that sought to define the extent to which
5
of property might injure the old with impunity.' 2
With slight revision this passage could have been written about modern groundwater law in those western states where (1) the doctrines
of absolute ownership, reasonable use, or correlative rights were rejected in favor of the appropriation doctrine to promote economic
development by giving security of investment; (2) the priority principle was initially regarded as giving a secure right to historic diversion systems without regard to their reasonableness; but (3) the initial inclination was replaced by a reasonable pumping level approach.
In a state like Idaho, then, it might be said that while great security
of investment (even absolute protection of historic diversion systems)
may initially have been perceived as promoting development, this approach "became increasingly vulnerable to the efficiency claims of
newer competing forms of property." The competing claims were
those of newcomers who wanted to take stored groundwater that
was providing lift for senior appropriators and use it more productively on the surface.
The commentary quoted above was in fact written about developments in American property law from 1780 to 1860 as the country
moved from an agrarian to a more industrialized economy. It demonstrates that tension between promoting economic development by
affording security of investment and blocking new economic growth
with too much security is a problem neither peculiar to the pumping
level question nor of recent origin.
A Cost-Benefit Perspective
The preceding discussion indicates that historically reasonable
pumping level statutes have been aimed in different states at the seem125. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
33-34 (1977).
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ingly divergent objectives of preventing or curtailing overdevelopment and promoting new development. In fact, these two objectives
need not diverge but can mesh together into a policy of optimum development: neither too much nor too little. The statutes that call for
full or maximum economic development could readily be interpreted
to mean optimum development in the sense just stated. The Idaho
court might have had this in mind in Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.
when it said:
Idaho's Ground Water Act seeks to promote "full economic development" of our ground water resources.... We hold that the
Ground Water Act is consistent with the constitutionally enunciated
policy of promoting optimum development of water resources in the
public interest. Idaho Const. art. 15, § 7. Full economic development

of Idaho's ground water resources can and will benefit all of our citizens. Trelease, F. J., Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulations, 5 Nat. Res. J. 1 (1965).126
The cited article by Dean Trelease cautions that maximization "does
not mean.., that man should develop and use water compulsively.
...

What is to be maximized is welfare from water use, not water use

itself.1' 2 7 Nor does maximization refer to immediate benefits only;
the problem is one of optimum allocation of water resources over
1
time. 281
At the national level, planning for optimum water development
has long been dominated by cost-benefit analysis.' 2 The Trelease
article cited in Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. regards extension of costbenefit analysis from its traditional sphere of federal public works
expenditures to new private water development projects as being
"[f]or the most part ...

obvious."'

3"

Further, a comprehensive

study prepared for the National Water Commission specifically advocates using a cost-benefit approach in groundwater management.' 3
Serious pursuit of a goal of optimum economic development in the
setting of groundwater pumping levels hardly seems possible without
resort to some form of cost-benefit analysis.
Thorough discussions of the general principles of cost-benefit analy126. 95 Idaho 575, 584, 513 P.2d 627, 636 (1973).
127. Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, 5 NAT. RES. J. 1, 3-4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Policies for Water Law].
128. See id. at 5, 13; see generally C. CORKER, supra note 2, at 128.
129. WATER POLICIES, supra note 16, at 380-81.
130. Policiesfor Water Law, supra note 127, at 14.
131. C. CORKER, supra note 2, at 128-30, 135-36. The advocacy was not without recognition of the need to consider also factors lying outside the traditional domain of economics. Id. at 137-42.
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sis and points of debate in cost-benefit theory are readily available.
Discussed below are some special considerations that arise in the use
of cost-benefit analysis to implement the reasonable groundwater
pumping level concept.

Inadequate Geohydrologic Data
Numerous potential physical effects from groundwater withdrawal
must be identified and quantified in dollars if the goal is to maximize
net benefits from the resources over time. 1 3 3 One such effect is interference with the supply to other wells.' 3 Another is interference
with surface water rights if the aquifer either receives recharge from
or discharges into the stream.' 3 Yet another is land compaction and
subsidence.1 36 In the San Joaquin Valley of California, for example,
the land surface has subsided as much as 29 feet in some areas, and
approximately 4200 square miles have experienced subsidence exceeding one foot.' 37 The undesirable effects of land subsidence include alteration of the flow of surface streams and irrigation canals,
breakage of pavement, collapse of well casings, obsolescence of topographical maps, and damage to buildings when pilings extend into the
zone of subsidence. Groundwater pumping can also affect the quality
of future withdrawals if water level decline increases recharge from a
polluted source. 1 3 8 The more dramatic occurrences have involved
salt water intrusion into coastal aquifers, but extensive saline water
intrusion of inland aquifers has also been reported. 1 3 9 Another environmental impact of groundwater level decline may be the destruction of phreatrophytes that provide wildlife habitat.' 40
Of course, not all of these potential physical consequences will be
encountered in every reasonable pumping level problem. In general,
as one moves from widespread overdraft to localized, overlapping
cones of pressure relief or depression, significant physical consequences other than well interference should become less likely. Also,
in a given state, widespread overdraft might be regulated more under
132. E.g., A. DASGUPTA & D. PEARCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1972); E.
MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (Rev. ed. 1976); P. SASSONE, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK (W. Schaffer ed. 1978).
133. See C. CORKER, supra note 2, at 128.
134. See page 4supra.
135. For discussion of streamflow-groundwater interaction in standard hydrologic
works, see D. TODD, supra note 14, at 151-55, and W. WALTON, supra note 15, at 174-88.
136. For further discussion, see W. WALTON, supra note 15, at 623-27.
137. GAO, supra note 8, at 15.
138. For further discussion, see D. TODD, supra note 14, at 177-78.
139. GAO, supra note 8, at 16-17.
140. For an account of opposition to phreatophyte removal because of its effect on
wildlife habitat, see Gilluly, Wildlife Versus Irrigation, 99 SCIENCE NEWS 184 (1971).
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a safe annual yield or natural recharge limitation 4 1 than under a
reasonable pumping level statute. Nevertheless, to the extent that
reasonable pumping levels are part of an overall program to optimize
groundwater use, calculation of benefits and costs would seem essential. That, in turn, requires knowledge of the physical consequences
of different alternatives. Unfortunately, all too often adequate hydrogeologic data to predict accurately the physical 1 consequences of
groundwater withdrawal is lacking in specific cases. 4 2
Uncertainty About the Role of Security of Investment
Will a rule that allows the water table to fall below the economic
reach of some senior appropriators, forcing them out of existence,
promote optimum use of undeveloped groundwater by facilitating
newer, more productive uses of the water? Even if short run economic gain can be expected, it must be asked whether the decrease in
security of investment to appropriators will impede economic development in the long run. Thus, full cost-benefit analysis of groundwater
pumping level policies requires making conclusions (or assumptions)
about how security of investment affects economic development.
A major difficulty is that little is known about the relationship between security of investment and economic development of groundwater. The appropriation doctrine tradition holds that a fair degree
of security is needed to promote development. 1 4 3 Another line of
thought, associated with an article entitled "The Tragedy of the Commons," 144 leads to the exact opposite conclusion. This view calls
groundwater, unlike coal for example, a common pool resource because extracting groundwater from one well can affect the availability
of water at other wells.1 45 Suppose the law does not limit groundwater withdrawals but allows anyone to take as much as he can capture.
The tragedy of the commons develops in the following way: Overlying owners drill wells in a common groundwater basin. After a period of time, total extraction approximately equals total replenishment to the basin, so that the basin is in a steady-state condition.
141. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
142. See, e.g., C. CORKER, supra note 2, at A1-70 ("We are comparatively naive about
aquifers because the reward for learning more about groundwater resources has not appeared
to warrant the expenditure of large sums of money."); Crosby, supra note 7, at 80-81,95-96;
GAO, supra note 8, at 30-34; WATER POLICIES, supra note 16, at 245; W. WALTON,
supra note 15, at 1.
143. See notes 109-10 and accompanying text supra.
144. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
145. See J. HIRSCHLIEFER, J.DEHAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY 59-66 (1960).
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Each owner, at that point, calculates whether it is to his benefit to
increase the amount he pumps. The advantage to him of an additional amount of water almost invariably exceeds the disadvantage
to him of a slightly lowered water table in the basin overall. The
owner will ordinarily conclude that he should pump the additional
amount: "But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational [overlying owner] ...sharing a commons. Therein is the traggedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase
1
his [pumping] ...without limit-in a world that is limited." 46
This suggests that a rule of capture, which affords no security of in-

vestment, will cause overdevelopment and not underdevelopment of
a common pool resource. The rationale is that a rule of capture will
stimulate efforts by each well owner to capture as much water as fast
as possible before someone else gets it.
Which view about the relationship of security of investment and
economic development is correct-traditional appropriation doctrine
thinking or the tragedy of the commons analysis? If optimum economic development, i.e., neither too much nor too little, is a goal of
groundwater management under the appropriation doctrine, the answer is important in setting pumping levels.
In theory, the question is subject to empirical investigation. If the
appropriation doctrine tradition is correct, then the absolute ownership rule should impede groundwater development because it is essentially a rule of capture. 147 If the tragedy of the commons view is
correct, then the absolute ownership rule should lead to overdevelopment. In practice, however, empirical investigation can become terribly complex. For example, Texas has the absolute ownership doctrine while Kansas and New Mexico have the appropriation doctrine
for percolating groundwater.' "8Tragedy of the commons analysis
suggests overdevelopment should be worse in Texas, while traditional
appropriation doctrine thinking leads one to expect relative underdevelopment in Texas. Yet, an observer of groundwater use in the
High Plains region of those states (albeit a self-acknowledged casual
observer) reported in 1961 that mining was occurring and tolerated
in all three states and that the patterns of development in them were
not dissimilar." '
146. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW,
FINAL REPORT 144 (1978).
147. See notes 111-114 and accompanying text supra.
148. See City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798
(1955); KAN. STAT. § § 82a-703, -707 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 72-12-1, -18 (1978).
Until 1945, however, Kansas had the absolute ownership doctrine. A SUMMARY DIGEST,
supra note 5, at 330.
149. Bagley, Water Rights Law and Public Policies Relating to Ground Water "Mining"
in the Southwestern States, 4 J. LAW & ECON. 144, 172 (1961).
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Even if the observation were correct, it fails to refute traditional
appropriation doctrine thinking about security of investment. Early
High Plains settlers believed their groundwater came from an inexhaustible source-a gigantic underground river that originated in the
Rocky Mountain region to the northwest and flowed under the High
Plains on its way to the Gulf of Mexico. This theory prevailed well
into the 1950s.' 1 0 Given this belief, it is hardly surprising that abstract legal insecurity of investment under the absolute ownership
doctrine did not impede development in Texas. Furthermore, even if
some Texans began to doubt the inexhaustible supply theory, there
was also the economic impact of favorable agricultural prices after
World War II.5 As the editor of a southwest farm journal wrote in
1948, "It is unsound to advocate to a farmer that he curtail pumping
when with top market prices he can pay for his irrigation installation
in the first year of operation."'

5

2

Perhaps the traditional view that lack of security impedes development is correct in situations requiring heavy investment of labor and
capital that probably could not be recouped without legally protected
security of investment. The contrary view that insecurity, i.e., a rule
of capture, leads to overdevelopment may be correct for situations in
which large initial investment either is not required to capture the resource or can be quickly recouped under prevailing economic conditions. If so, the actual effect of a policy of reduced security of investment under the reasonable pumping level concept will depend upon
(1) how landowners view their prospects of capturing enough groundwater to recoup development costs before someone with a deeper
economic reach puts them out of business, and (2) their willingness
to gamble.
The premise of some reasonable pumping level statutes that absolute protection of security of investment stifles economic development' - 3 presents an analogous situation. Opponents of this premise
contend that junior well owners must be held liable for interference
with the historic diversion systems of senior wells to avoid overdevelopment.1I4 Their rationale is that without liability, a junior will
150. D. GREEN, THE LAND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAIN: IRRIGATION ON
THE TEXAS HIGH PLAINS 165, 167-68 (1973).
151. Bagley, supra note 149, at 173, noted the influence of economic conditions upon
groundwater development in the High Plains region of Kansas, New Mexico and Texas.
152. Gowen, Economics of Irrigation, SOUTHWESTERN CROP AND STOCK 50 (Sept.
1948), quoted in D. GREEN, supra note 150, at 183.
153. This premise is made explicit in COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973) and
IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1980).
154. Morse, Well Pumping and a Declining Water Table-An Economic Analysis (unpublished paper prepared for Water Law, Stanford University, June 1, 1967), excerpted in C.
MEYERS & A. D. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 686 (2d ed. 1979).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

pump as long as the benefits he obtains exceed his own water extraction costs even though the total costs (his own costs plus increased
pumping costs to seniors) exceed the benefits. This is the tragedy of
the commons analysis all over again. Which view is correct should depend upon (1) the availability and reliability of predictive groundwater basin models, and (2) the willingness of landowners to gamble
on new development.
Suppose, for example, that a landowner wants to put in a new well.
Over a given time period, his expected gross benefits are $100,000
and his expected pumping costs are $60,000. In addition, the well
will cause water level decline that increases the pumping costs of
senior well owners by $20,000. Under a rule making him liable to
seniors for interference with their historic diversion systems, he would
develop the well if he were omniscient, since the total benefits are
$100,000 and the total costs to him are $80,000 (assuming no litigation or negotiation expenses). The goal of economic efficiency says
he should develop the well. Not being omniscient, however, the landowner does not know whether his liability to seniors will run $20,000
or double or triple that. If the landowner is not inclined to gamble,
he will not develop the new well. If this illustration is typical, a legal
rule giving seniors absolute (or high) security of investment will stifle
desirable economic development.' 1 -1
In short, using cost-benefit analysis to establish groundwater pumping level policy requires an assessment of costs in the form of undue
deterrence or overstimulation of development associated with varying amounts of security of investment. The difficulty in making that
assessment is that we know little in specific terms about how various
degrees of security of investment will affect economic development
of groundwater in diverse fact situations.
Selection of a Geographical Accounting Area
Cost-benefit analysis requires choice of a geographical accounting
area: a physical area over which to count costs and benefits.1 I 6 The
area might be national, regional over several states, state-wide, or regional within a state. Groundwater codes have been a matter of state
legislation and typically are administered by state agencies. Thus, the
natural tendency may be to stop counting costs and benefits at state
lines. One problem with this is that the physical effects of ground155. This would seem to be true regardless of whether the legal remedy afforded seniors
is damages or injunctive relief.
156. See generally WATER POLICIES, supra note 16, at 42; P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, supra note 132, at 159-60.
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water withdrawal are not necessarily limited to state boundaries.
Also, if populations and economies develop at higher rates than can
be supported by the long term water supply, crisis oriented solutions
may be required that involve large expenditures and federally funded
assistance.' s' Thus, a geographically wide cost-benefit perspective
seems desirable.
This raises the legal question of whether a state water agency has
power to count costs and benefits accruing outside state borders.
Bean v. Morris' I 8 and Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water Commission' I are of interest in this regard.' 60 In Bean, the United
States Supreme Court upheld a Montana federal court decree protecting senior appropriators in Wyoming against depletion of the stream
by upstream junior appropriators in Montana. The court "assumed"
Montana would be willing to ignore boundaries and allow the same
rights to be acquired from outside the state as within. It made this
assumption because (1) absent legislation to the contrary, it had
done so in earlier cases involving easements and other private rights
across a common boundary, and (2) "Montana cannot be presumed
to be intent on suicide, and there are as many if not more cases in
which it would lose as there are in which it would gain, if it invoked
a trial of strength with its neighbors."' 61 Thus, under Bean, a state
inclined' 62 to administer water for the benefit of people in another
state would seem to have power to do so.
The remaining questions are whether such power may be delegated
to an administrative agency and how readily such delegation will be
found. The Colorado Ground Water Commission applies a three mile
test to determine whether designated groundwater is available for
new wells:
[A] circle with a three mile radius is drawn around the proposed
well site. A rate of pumping is determined which would result in a
40% depletion of the available ground water in that area over a
period of 25 years. If that rate of pumping is being exceeded by the
157. See GAO, supra note 8, at 5-8.
158. 221 U.S. 485 (1910).
159. 194 Colo. 489, 575 P.2d 372 (1978).
160. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-214(1) (1979) (state water agency may exercise any of its powers in an adjoining state unless not permitted under the laws of that state
or the United States); C. CORKER, supra note 2, at 245-47 (discussing interstate agreements between administrative agencies regarding interstate waters).
161. Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 487 (1910).
162. Corker, Water Rights in Interstate Streams, in 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS
§ 131.3(C) (R. Clark ed. 1967) concludes that Bean is ambiguous as to whether the Court's
assumption about Montana's inclination to do so was an inference of fact, a rebuttable presumption, or a substantive rule of federal law stated as a legal fiction.
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existing wells within the circle, 6then
the application for a permit to
3
drill a new well may be denied.
The issue in Thompson was how to apply the three mile test to a well
that the plaintiff proposed to sink in Colorado near the Nebraska
border, so that 24% of the circle fell in Nebraska. The aquifer flowed
from Colorado into Nebraska. The commission considered only the
Colorado portion of the circle, concluded the proposed well would
cause depletion exceeding 40% over 25 years, and denied plaintiffs
application for a permit. If the commission had considered the water
supply in the whole three mile circle, the plaintiff would have been
entitled to a permit because only the Colorado portion of the three
mile circle was overappropriated. The court held that the state-line
policy was within the commission's delegated authority and that it
implemented legislative directives in a reasonable manner. The court
accepted the commission's view that further appropriation on the
Colorado side of the line "with intent to stabilize or reverse the aquifer flow to the benefit of Colorado, would seriously injure vested
Colorado rights far west of the state line and could ignite a destruc1
tive aquifer depletion race with Nebraska, an adjoining state." 64
The court upheld an application of the three mile test that benefited Nebraska, then, partly because it also benefited Colorado by
avoiding a destructive aquifer depletion race with Nebraska. The Colorado commission's refusal to go beyond state boundaries in applying
the three mile test in Thompson was held proper not because the
effect in Nebraska was irrelevant to Colorado interests but for the
exact opposite reason. The Thompson case arguably is authority for
a state agency empowered to do cost-benefit analysis of groundwater
pumping levels to carry the accounting beyond state boundaries if
the agency's own state would gain through improved interstate water
relations.
CONCLUSION
The two extreme approaches to the pumping level issue are that
(1) well owners have no protection whatsoever in their diversion systems and each must pay his own costs of coping with declining water
levels, and (2) existing appropriators are absolutely protected in their
historic diversion systems and have injunctive or damage remedies
163. Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835,
836 (1970). The latest refinement of the three mile test is discussed in Berens v. Ground
Water Comm'n, 614 P.2d 352 (1980).
164. Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 194 Colo. 489, 575 P.2d 372, 377

(1978).
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against interference by junior users. Whatever the merits of these extreme views, 6' neither has much support in the West today. The
appropriation doctrine states have overwhelmingly opted for a middle
ground stated in terms of the reasonable pumping level standard.
Undoubtedly some of the appeal of this standard lies in the flexibility allowed because of its vagueness. 1 6 6 In implementing the standard, however, the task is to move somehow from a general, widely
approved concept 1 6 7 to particular fact situations. This article has
sought to contribute to that process by exploring, from historic and
cost-benefit perspectives, the economic goals underlying or associated
with reasonable groundwater pumping levels under the appropriation
doctrine.
Few would contend, however, that economics is all that does or
should count in resource allocation. While cost-benefit analysis can
reveal that a new pumping level will be more economically efficient
than an existing one, that computation alone cannot answer the normative question of why those who will gain from switching to the
new level should do so if others will lose from the change. 1 6 8 Modem
resource allocation literature recognizes the impact upon allocation
decisions of other goals, often called social goals. 1 69 These include
societal views regarding (1) the distribution of wealth, e.g., how
equally or unequally wealth should be distributed, and (2) the distribution of so-called merit goods, e.g., whether everyone regardless of
personal wealth should have available a minimum level of certain
goods or services such as food, medical care, or education. Although
wealth and merit good distribution are the most often discussed
social goals, other possibilities have been suggested that were "originally linked to efficiency, [but] have now a life of their own."' '7
In short, the reasonable pumping level standard has an important
economic dimension that must be understood if the standard is to be
implemented intelligently. The analysis cannot stop there, however.
Also necessary are an appreciation of the normative limitations of
cost-benefit analysis and an awareness of social goals implicit in the
165. See notes 120, 143-46, and 154 and accompanying text supra.
166. Cf Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 727, 738 (1978) (a
vague phrase is sometimes used intentionally to provide a general compass heading when it
is not possible to map the trail in detail).
167. Who would want to argue against a standard of "reasonableness"?
168. See B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xiii
(1975); E. MISHAN, supra note 132, at 412-13.
169. E.g., C. CORKER, supra note 2, at xxii, 127-42; WATER POLICIES, supra note 16,
at 271 n.81; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098-101 (1972).
170. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 169, at 1105.
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reasonable pumping level statutes. In addition, related features of
appropriation doctrine law, and possibly even laws not directly related to water allocation must be considered. A future article is
planned to explore these points.

